In Vault, the backend stores opaque blocks {iv, ciphertext}. It does not encrypt, does not decrypt, and never knows your master password.
The right question to ask a password manager is not «Do you promise not to look?», but «Can you look?». In Vault, the answer is no: the server has no means to do so.
Vault is a zero-knowledge password manager: all encryption and decryption occur in your browser using the WebCrypto API. Your master password is used to derive an AES-256-GCM key with PBKDF2 (310,000 iterations, SHA-256) which is marked as non-exportable, so even the app's own code cannot extract it. That key encrypts each entry before it leaves your device.
What travels to our servers for each login entry or secure note are exactly three fields: the initialization vector (iv), the ciphertext, and the entry type. Nothing more. The site, username, password, and notes are contained within the ciphertext, which for the backend is a meaningless base64 string.
From the vault itself, only public parameters are stored: the random salt, the number of PBKDF2 iterations, and a verifier encrypted with your own key. With these, your browser can re-derive the key and check if the master password you just entered is correct. That check happens on your device: the server never receives the master password, neither in plain text nor hashed, and would not be able to tell if it is correct or not.
The backend also has no code to attempt it. Its operations are to store, list, update, and delete encrypted blobs: it validates that the iv and ciphertext are not empty and stores them as is. There is no encryption or decryption function on the server, nor any key that would unlock it. If tomorrow someone compromised the database, they would take away unreadable data.
Three fields per entry and nothing more
the server only receives {iv, ciphertext, type}. The site, username, password, and notes are encrypted within the ciphertext.
AES-256-GCM encryption in your browser
the key is derived with PBKDF2 and 310,000 iterations, and created as a non-exportable WebCrypto key. It is not stored on any server.
The master password is never transmitted
it is not sent in plain text or hashed. The server does not store it and has no way to validate it.
Client-side validation with a verifier
the server stores a small encrypted blob, and your device checks if the master password decrypts it. AES-GCM fails if the key is incorrect or if the data was tampered with.
A database leak does not expose secrets
anyone who took the tables would see encrypted base64. Without your master password, thereās nothing to read.
There is no backdoor because there is no door
the backend does not include any encryption or decryption routines. Itās not an internal policy; the code simply cannot do it.
Honesty about metadata
the entry type (login entry or secure note) and creation and modification dates are stored in plain text, because the app needs them for sorting and listing. The content, never.
The trade-off you should know
if you forget your master password, no one can recover your data. Thereās no email reset, and thatās precisely the proof that the server cannot decrypt it.

Open your vault in Vault, choose your master password, and start saving encrypted login entries in less than a minute. Free.